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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD 0. BJORK, HERMAN A.
BJORK, BEATRICE A. WILCOX
and ARTHUR ANDERSON,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Respondents, )
vs.
APRIL INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 14620

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APRIL INDUSTRIES, INC.

NATURE OF CASE
Appellant is the defendant in this action.

Plain-

tiffs brought suit for damages alleging defendant's breach of
an agreement to register their shares in a public offering of
other common shares of defendant's stock.

Plaintiffs also

sought judgment ordering defendant to issue to plaintiffs new
stock certificates without any restrictive legend.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
After the trial of this matter in March of 1975
the district court ordered defendant to issue unrestricted
certificates but refused to award plaintiffs any damages.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
From this ruling
on and
damages
appealed.
In March
Library Services
Technologyplaintiffs
Act, administered by
the Utah State Library.
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of this year this Court ruled that plaintiffs were entitled
to damages for defendant's breach of the registration agreement.

On remand the trial court entered judgment (1) re-

quiring defendant to issue new certificates without restrictive legend and (2) awarding damages and accrued interest in
the amount of $55,239.28.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits that plaintiffs are not entitled
to the inconsistent remedies of money damages and an order
requiring defendant to issue new stock certificates.

There-

fore, defendant seeks a ruling of this Court that plaintiffs
are not entitled to money damages.

Alternatively, appellant

requests an order requiring defendants, as a condition to the
recovery of damages, to renounce any claim or interest in the
shares in question.

In addition, appellant seeks a ruling

from this Court that the prejudgment interest awarded to
plaintiffs was excessive and improper.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September of 1969, plaintiffs, as members of
the Board of Directors of Alta Helena Mining and Milling
Company, issued to themselves 16,000 common shares of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-2Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

company's stock. 1

This issuance was made to compensate the

plaintiffs for past services rendered to the company.

The

certificates representing ownership of these shares were
stamped with a restrictive legend stating that the shares
could not be freely sold or transferred.

Plaintiffs also

obligated the company to include the shares being issued to
them in any future public offering of the company's common
stock.

This inclusion was to be at no expense to plaintiffs.
In February of 1972 defendant offered its stock

for sale to the public.
share.
included

The offering price was $13.00 per

None of the shares belonging to plaintiffs were
in this offering.

In May of 1974 plaintiffs filed

suit because of defendant's failure to include their shares
in the 1972 offering.
The trial court in its original judgment entered in
April of 1975 found that (1) the September agreement was valid
and enforceable, that (2) the plaintiffs' shares had not been

1.

Defendant April Industries, Inc. is the successor through
merger to Alta Helena Mining and Milling Company. As
part of such merger transactions April Industries' common
shares were recapitalized so that each one of the present
April Industries shares represents 4 shares of the old
Alta Helena Mining and Milling Company. Thus the original
16,000 shares now represent 4,000 shares.
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included in the offering, and that (3) the plaintiffs had
waived any right they might have had to damages.

The trial

court then gave plaintiffs judgment and ordered defendant to
issue to plaintiffs new stock certificates without any
restrictive legend.
This Court, in an opinion filed March 12, 1976,
reversed the lower court's ruling on plaintiffs' damage
claims and remanded the case with instructions to enter a
money judgment for plaintiffs.

Bjork, et al v. April Industries,

547 P.2d 219 (Utah 1976).
On May 28, 1976, the trial court entered its second
judgment ordering defendant to issue to each of the plaintiffs
new certificates without restrictive legend for 1,000 shares
of defendant's common stock.

In addition, each plaintiff was

awarded judgment in the amount of $10,982.50 with interest in
the amount of $2,827.32, for a total judgment of $55,239.28.
(R. 11)

The damage calculation was as follows:

This Court's

opinion held the measure of damages to be the highest price
during the public offering less the stock's present value.
(See 547 P.2d at 221)

Plaintiffs presented evidence that the

highest price during the offering was 12.75 dollars. (R. 8,9) Ft
-4-
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this number was subtracted a sales commission, typical for
transactions in stocks like defendant's, of 7%.
figure was 11.8575 dollars per share.

The resulting

Plaintiffs' evidence

also showed that the stock was worth 87 1/2 cents a share
on March 12, 1976.

(R. 5)

By subtracting .875 dollars from

11.8575 and multiplying by 1,000, the number of shares held
by each plaintiff, a damage figure of $10,982.50 was computed.
To this figure was added prejudgment interest of $2,827.32,
computed at 6% from February 3, 1972, the date of the offering.
ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court awarded plaintiffs inconsistent

remedies and unjustly enriched them.
In its second judgment, the trial court awarded
plaintiffs inconsistent remedies.

Plaintiffs are to receive

an amount in damages virtually equivalent to what they would
have received had they sold their shares in the public offering.2 The trial court also told plaintiffs that they could

2.

Since April's stock has declined in value, the offset
for the present value of the stock is very small. The
present value of the stock reduced the amount of the
judgment by only $875.00 for each plaintiff, or a total
reduction of $3,500.00
-5-
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keep their shares.

Thus, plaintiffs are to receive the

proceeds from the sale of their stock without actually
selling that stock.
In Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045 (1955), the Utah
Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of election of remedies
as follows:
"The doctrine of election of remedies applies
as a bar only where the two actions are
inconsistent; . • . " (289 P.2d at 1049)
In Rogers v. United Western Minerals Co., 8 Utah
2d 1, 326 P.2d 1019 (1958), the plaintiff sued for past due
installments under a contract for the sale of certain mining
claims.

In its complaint plaintiff sought both a reconvey-

ance of these claims and the allegedly past due amounts.
Though the case was reversed on other grounds, the Utah
Supreme Court explicitly stated that the plaintiff could not
recover both a reconveyance of the claims and the past due
amounts.

Plaintiff had, so the court held, at some point to

make an election so that it would not be awarded inconsistent
remedies.
In Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 19 Utah 2d 403,
432 P.2d 37 (1967), the plaintiff brought suit on a uniform
real estate contract for alleged delinquencies in the monthly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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payments due under the agreement.

Plaintiff's complaint

sought both a recovery of the delinquent amounts and cancellation of the contract.

The Court held that these two

remedies were inconsistent and that plaintiff at some point
during the proceedings had to elect between them.
A Colorado case factually very similar to the
instant action is Thornburg v. Homestead Minerals Corporation, 513 P.2d 219 (Colo. App. 1973).

Plaintiff sought

damages against the defendant corporation and its attorneys
for profits allegedly lost during the time when the defendants refused to remove a restrictive legend from her certificates.
The evidence showed that in February of 1969

the

plaintiff purchased a large block of shares in the defendant
corporation.

Her certificates bore the legend "investment

stock not subject to transfer until the 29th day of March,
1969."

On the March date plaintiff was told by the corpor-

ation's attorney, who was also its secretary, that the
restriction could not be removed.

Plaintiff then brought

suit in Utah against the defendant corporation seeking removal of the restrictive legend.

Plaintiff was successful

in this action, and on October 30, 1970, new certificates

-7- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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were issued to her.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff sued in Colorado
claiming damages.

During the period when her shares were

restricted the market price for the stock was as high as
$8.00 per share; by the time the restriction was removed,
the price was only 55 cents a share.

The trial court

granted defendant's motion for summary judgment; this ruling was affirmed on appeal:
"The defendants are correct in their contention that plaintiff's election to seek
clear title to the certificates thereafter
estopped her from seeking damages in a subsequent action for lost profits on sales
she might have made while the transferability
of the stock was being wrongfully withheld.
The test of whether an election of remedies
has been made when suit is filed under one
theory, so as to estop a subsequent suit
under an ultimate theory, is whether the
relief sought is inconsistent." (513 P.2d
at 220) (Emphasis added)
The Thornburg opinion cited witn approval
v. Merts, 240 Ark. 1080, 405 S.W. 2d 273 (1966).

~

In this

Arkansas case plaintiffs sued for specific performance of
a contract for the sale of shares of stock in the Pine
Bluff National Bank.

The Arkansas Supreme Court, in ruling

that the plaintiffs could enforce the contract, specifically
rejected plaintiffs' claim that they were entitled to damages
for the decline in the value of the stock after their offer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, -8may contain errors.

to purchase had been rejected.

This ruling was based on

the general rule that one cannot recover both specific
performance and damages.
Both Thornburg, supra, and Merts, supra, relied
upon Virginia Public Service Co. v. Steindler, 166 Va. 686,
187 S.E. 353 (1936) where the Virginia Supreme Court rejected
plaintiff's argument that he could compel the transfer of a
stock certificate into his name and also receive damages for
the decline in the stock's value between the time the transfer
should have been made and the date when it was actually
completed.

As the court stated:

"The question for decision may be thus put:
Is the holder of a certificate of stock,
who elects to sue in equity to compel the
transfer of the stock to his name, after
receiving the same together with all
dividends accumulated during the controversy, with interest thereon, and after
selling the stock pending the litigation,
entitled to recover of the corporation
damages measured by the decline in the
market value of the stock between the
date the transfer should have been made
and when it was actually made, when such
decline was due to no fault of tne corporation?
Although the question is not free from
difficulty, we think it must be answered
in the negative . .
By their form of action the complaintants
have insisted that they were the equitable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-9Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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owners of the stock as of the date it
should have been transferred to them.
They have demanded that they be clothed
with all of the incidents of ownership
as of that date, and on this theory
they have obtained the transfer, and have
collected all dividends on the stock,
with interest. They have thus obtained
every right which a stockholder has as
of the desired time.
But one of the incidents of ownership
of property, which complaintants overlooked, is that property is subject to
depreciation as well as appreciation in
value. This is a risk which every owner
of property assumes. It is a risk which
the complaintants took when they asked
that they be placed in the position of
owners of the stock as of August, 1931."
(187 S.E. at 355, 356)
The inconsistent recovery condemned in Thornburg,
Merts, and Steindler was granted to plaintiffs by the trial
court's judgment.

The defendant must pay damages because

plaintiffs could not sell their stock.

Yet, the judgment

also tells defendant that it must issue to plaintiffs new
certificates for that stock.

Defendant must also pay to

plaintiffs whatever dividends may be declared; it must also
permit plaintiffs to vote the shares.
being told:

Defendant is in effect

"You are going to have to pay for those shares,

but you are not going to be allowed to buy them. 11 3

3.

Plaintiffs' claims can be analogized to the law of sales.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A simple example trenchantly demonstrates the
error of the trial court's judgment.

Let us assume that

defendant pays plaintiffs money damages and issues to them
the new certificates.
stock rises.
a share.

In the interim the price of plaintiffs'

Let us assume it once again reaches $13.00

Plaintiffs will then be able to sell their stock

and realize a double recovery on their 1,000 shares.

In the

meantime, they will have received whatever dividends have
been issued by the company and they will have been able to
vote their shares.

Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to what they
would have received had their shares been included in
the 1972 offering; they are seeking the equivalent of
either (1) specific performance or (2) an action for
the price. If they are asking for what is in effect
specific performance, plaintiffs must obviously give
up the ownership of their shares. The same is true
of an action for the price. Under both the Uniform
Commercial Code and pre-Code law an action for
the price is only possible where the seller has
delivered goods to the defaulting buyer or the risk
of loss has passed from the seller to the buyer.
See U.C.C. §2-709. A seller is not entitled to sue
for the sales price and at the same time keep the
goods to be sold. The obvious reason for this rule
is to prevent the seller from being unjustly enriched
by being paid for goods which he is going to keep.
In Murray v. Americare Medical Designs, Inc. 123 Ga.
App. 557, 181 S.E.2d 871 (1971), the plaintiff, who
had supplied plans and supervised construction of a
medical building being erected by the defendants,
brought suit for breach of the construction agreement.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The stock may not, of course, increase in value;
but that is hardly the point.

The real point is that plain-

tiffs will be able to hold their stock and thus speculate on
a possible future price rise after having been paid in
damages virtually the entire value of the shares.
II.

Plaintiffs are foreclosed from recovering

damages because of a ruling of the trial court from which
plaintiffs took no appeal.
At trial in March of 1975 plaintiffs attempted on
a highly technical theory of conversion to tender their

On a petition for rehearing after judgment for the
plaintiff the issue concerned the ownership of certain
cabinets and hardware items to be placed in the building. The court found that the evidence as to the location and ownership of the cabinets was conflicting.
It resolved the dilemma by holding that the defendant
would, by paying the judgment, be entitled to take
possession of the cabinets and other hardware items.
As the court stated:
"It is obvious, however, that when this
defendant pays off the judgment against
him representing damages equivalent to
the purchase price of the casework and
hardware he becomes by that fact the
owner of the merchandise and entitled to
whatever value it may have, since to allow
the plaintiff or the manufacturer full payment plus goods involved would result in
an unjust enrichment. In this connection
see Code Ann. 109A-2-709. [The Georgia
Provision of Section 2-709 of the Uniform
Commerical Code]." (181 S.E.2d at 873874) (Emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shares into court and by thus renouncing any interest in
the shares claim the entire offering price of the stock as
damages.4

The trial court quite properly rejected this

tender. (R.381)

Plaintiffs did not appeal this ruling and

never at any time during subsequent proceedings have they
questioned its correctness.
The trial court's ruling on plaintiffs' proffered
tender is significant for two reasons.

First, the ruling

should have limited plaintiffs' recovetyto the removal of
the restrictive legend from their certificates.

Under pre-

vailing rules of appellate practice, plaintiffs' failure to
appeal the ruling should preclude any appellate award of
damages.

Cf. In Re Jones Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210

(1940); Aiken v. Less Taylor Motor Co., 110 Utah 265, 171 P.2d
676 (1946); Keller v. Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.2d 118 (1953);
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954).
Second, their attempted tender shows that plaintiffs
understood that they needed to choose the remedy they were

4.

In the prior and related case of Lowe v. April Industries,
531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1975) the plaintiffs elected at
trial to renounce all interest in their April shares and
thus were able to collect damages for both conversion
and for defendant's breach of the registration agreement.
This election in the prior action was, unlike the instant
case, accepted by the trial court.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
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to pursue.

They understood that they could not recover

damages equivalent to the sales price for the shares and,
at the same time, keep those shares.

It would be ironic

to suggest that plaintiffs, having failed on their attempt
to give up their shares, snould be able to keep those shares
and yet recover damages because tnose shares were not sold.
III.

The lower court's judgment, in effect,

deprives defendant of its property without due process of
law.
Because defendant is, in practical effect, being
compelled to buy stock which plaintiffs' are keeping, defendant is being deprived of the property for which it is paying.
This case thus takes on the dimensions of deprivation of
property without due process of law in violation of both the
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, sec. 7
of the Constitution of the State of Utah.

Cf., e.g., Thompson

v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624 (1960);
Fuentes v. Shevins, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972); Snaidach
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.
2d 349 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011
(1969).5

5.

Cf. the statement in Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 Utah
39, 300 Pac. 1040 (1931) this Court held that a purchaser's
cause of action for stock sold in violation of a Utah Blue
Sky Law survived the legislature's repeal of the act.

She could

still sue after repeal because her right to sue was a vested
property right; this right could not be taken from her by a
judicial ruling that her claim was extinguished by the act's
repeal.
If defendant has to pay for plaintiffs' stock,
it should not be deprived of that stock by the type of judicial ruling condemned in Buttrey.

To hold otherwise is to

take appellant's property without due process.
IV.

The trial court's judgment awards to plaintiffs

an excessive amount of prejudgment interest.

405 U.S. 543, 92 S.Ct. 1113 (1972):
"The right to enjoy property without unlawful
deprivation, no less than the right to speak
or the right to travel, is in truth, a 'personal' right, whether the 'property' in
question be a welfare check, a home, or a
savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal
right to liberty and the personal right in
property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are
basic civil rights has long been recognized."
(92 s.ct. at 1122) (Citations omitted)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As stated, each of the plaintiffs was awarded
$2,827.32 as prejudgment interest.

This award was excessive

because it permitted the recovery of interest computed from
February 3, 1972, when in fact the amount of plaintiffs'
damages was not ascertainable until March 12, 1976; any
prejudgment interest to be awarded should only run from this
March date and not from February of 1972.
The Utah rule on prejudgment interest was established in Fell v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 32 Utah
101, 88 Pac. 1003 (1907).

The case involved plaintiff's

claim that livestock being shipped by him on defendant's
railroad either died or lost weight because of a delay in
shipment.
The trial court allowed plaintiff interest from
the time when he first made demand on the defendant for
the claimed damages.

The Supreme Court held that the award

of such interest was proper.

In doing so it laid down the

following test for determining the propriety of prejudgment
interest:
"The true test to be applied as to whether
~ntere~t should be allowed before judgment
in a given case or not is, therefore, not
whether the damages are unliquidated or
otherwise, but whether the injury and con-16-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sequent damages are complete and must be
ascertained as of a particular time and
in accordance with fixed rules of evidence
and known standards of value, which the
court or jury must follow in fixing the
amount, rather than be guided by their
best judgment in assessing the amount to
be allowed for past as well as for future
injury, or for elements that cannot be
measured by any fixed standards of value.
The same rule under the same conditions
would of necessity apply to actions for
breach of contract." 88 Pac. at 1007
(Emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court has recently cited with
approval the quoted language from Fell in Utah Pipeline
Corporation v. White Superior Company, 546 P.2d 885 (Utah
1976).

In this recent case the Utah Supreme Court held

that prejudgment interest was measurable from the date of
the destruction of the compressor, because its value was
clearly ascertainable as of that date.

See also Gillespie

v. Blood, 81 Utah 306, 17 P.2d 822 (1932); St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 195 P. 305 (1921).
This Court's opinion on the first appeal awarded
plaintiffs damages for the "difference between the present
market value and the highest price obtainable during the
period of the breach which we perceive would be the highest
price reached during the public offering less sales cost."
(547 P.2d at 221)

In its reference to "present market value,"

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Court presumably meant March 12, 1976, the opinion's
date.

Thus, plaintiffs' damages were calculated by sub-

tracting the value of the stock on March 12, 1976, from the
value on the date of the February, 1972, public offering.
Thus, the damage computation was not complete, final and
fixed until March 12, 1976, and under the rule of Fell the
earliest date from which interest could be allowed would be
March 12, 1976.
The choice of the March 12th date is critical to
the amount of both damages and of prejudgment interest.
If,

fo~

example, the value of the April Industries stock

had been more than 87 1/2 cents on March 12, 1976, the
plaintiffs' judgment would be less and the prejudgment interest would be correspondingly reduced.

If damages were

being measured from any date other than March 12, 1976,
both the damages and the amount of any permissible prejudgment interest would be different.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief appellant
April Industries, Inc., respectfully submits that this Court
should reverse the lower court's judgment and remand this
-18-
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case with instructions that plaintiffs be awarded no money
damages.

Alternatively, appellant would request that this

Court reverse the lower court's judgment with instructions
that plaintiffs be required to renounce any claim or interest which they have in their stock as a condition to the
recovery of damages.

Finally, appellant seeks a ruling of

this Court that the award of prejudgment interest from
February 3, 1972, was erroneous.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY

Kenneth W. Yeates
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
April Industries, Inc.
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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